Exceptions to the Liability of Trustees by Zoob, David B.
April, 1935
EXCEPTIONS TO THE LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES
DAVID B. Zoot
Limitations upon the trustee's liability for breach of trust present an
interesting problem thrust into the foreground by the turbulent economic
situation of recent years. As always, the human desire to speculate has
caused beneficiaries as well as trustees to succumb to the Crcesus complex
engendered by prosperity; consequently, the trust questions most frequently
litigated or in process of adjustment generally involve attempts to surcharge
trustees with losses predicated either on investment in non-legal securities or
on unauthorized retention of non-legal investments acquired from the estate
of the testator or settlor.1 In situations where the beneficiaries under the
trust have acquiesced or concurred in or released the wrongful acts com-
plained of, the trustee may seek sanctuary under the enveloping folds of a
doctrine based on the trinity of "Consent, Affirmation and Release", com-
monly referred to as "exceptions" to the liability of a trustee for breach of
trust.2 The extent and implications of these exceptions are not confined to
speculative investments of the character mentioned above; they reach as well
a breach of any of the other duties owed by the trustee to the cestui que trust,
some of which grow out of the relation itself, others of which are dictated
either by the terms of the trust or by statute.3
Moreover, such exceptions have been accepted from an early date with-
out comment or analysis as an inherent and even desirable principle of law
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I. The making of unauthorized investments and the retention of non-legal securities re-
ceived from the estate of testator have always been pressing problems during speculative
times and "few things are more common than for the beneficiary to concur in and even-
such is the desire of poor mortals for an increase of their income-to instigate breaches of
trust". BnmELT, THE DUTIES AND LiArnuTms oF TRUSTEES (i897) 116. For discussion of
the problem of continuation of a decedent's business by his trustees or personal representatives
see Note (g) 40 A. L. R. (N. s.) 234. See also Note (1873) 44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 896, 951.
2. The rule has been generally stated as follows: "If trustees make an improper invest-
ment with the knowledge, consent and acquiescence, or at the request of the cestui que trust
they cannot be held to make good the loss, if one happens; but the cestui que trust, to be
affected by such consent or acquiescence must be id juris." PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(7th ed. 1928) § 467. See also HmL, THE LAw RELATING TO TRUSTEES ( 4th Am. ed. 1867)
821: "A trustee may be exonerated from the consequences of a breach of trust, either by an
express release from the cestui que trusts, or by their having concurred or acquiesced in its
commission."
3. Among such duties are: (I) duty to administer the trust, (2) duty of loyalty, (3)
duty not to delegate, (4) duty to keep and render accounts, (5) duty to furnish information,
(6) duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, (7) duty to take and keep control, (8)' duty
to preserve the trust property, (9) duty to enforce claims, (io) duty to defend actions, (ix)
duty to keep trust property separate, (12) duty with respect to bank deposits, (3) duty to
make the trust property productive, (4) duty to pay income to beneficiary, (x5) duty to deal
impartially with beneficiaries, (16) duty with respect to co-trustees. See RESTATEmENT,
TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, I93O) §§ i64-i79.
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by all writers on trusts.4  As long ago as the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the doctrine had assumed such proportions that it was conventionally
accepted by the practitioners of the time as an unquestioned method of pro-
tecting trustees. In a series of lectures delivered before Lincoln's Inn in the
year I825,5 the exceptions were alluded to as a protection against the uncer-
tain liability which confronted the trustee in the performance of his duty.
The gratuitous nature of the trust office, the difficulties of obtaining compe-
tent advice, the delay and expense of obtaining a decree of the court of
chancery to guide the trustee-all tended toward making the doctrine of the
exceptions socially desirable.' Yet, in view of the somewhat summary man-
ner in which the doctrine of the exceptions is today being applied, it would
seem pertinent to re-examine the historical and logical premises of the rule
for the purpose of determining its validity and desirability under present
conditions.
The task is too broad to permit a treatment of all the questions imping-
ing upon the main inquiry: the extent of the right of beneficiaries who have
not assented to the breach of trust to contribution from the assenting bene-
ficiary's interest in the trust; 7 the doctrine of laches as a bar to the bene-
ficiary's recovery; S the extent to which deviation and even termination of
trust can be permitted with the consent of the beneficiary.f These and a
number of other important problems are necessarily incidental. They can
be touched upon only in passing, since their inclusion would not materially
aid in an analysis of the raison d'tre for the exceptions.
I
The trust device now accepted as an ordinary mechanical incident in
the disposition of property did not have legal existence until a method of
enforcement became available. 10 As Lewin puts it:
"Originally the only pledge for the due execution of the trust was
the faith and integrity of the trustee; but the mere feeling of honour
4. See SPENCE, EguITA~rn JURiSDIcTioN OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1849) 936, 937;
HmL, THE LAW RELATnNG TO TRUSTEES (4th Am. ed. 1867) 821; 2 BEACH, LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1897) § 695; UNDERHm, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (ist Am. ed. 1896)' 468;
LORiNG, TRUST.ES HANDBOOK (3d ed. 19o7) 176 et seq; GoDEIEor, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(5th ed. 1927) 694; LEwN, TRUSTS (W3th ed. 1928) 974 et seq.; 28 HALsBURY, LAWS op
E rNGLAND (914) § 399, et seq.
5. SIR GEORGE FRANCIS HAm1PSON, A SHORT TREATISE ENDEAVOURING TO POINT OUT THE
MEANS BY WHICH THOSE WHo AccEPT THE SITUATION OF TRUSTEES MAY PERFORm THEIR
DUTIES WITHOUT INCURRNG REsPoNsmmY (185).
6. Ibid.
7. See GoDmoi, op. cit. s'upra note 4, at 684.
8. See RESTATE MENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1932) §211. In England by statute the
trustee is entitled to plead the Statute of Limitations, except where the claim is founded upon
fraud or is to recover trust property the proceeds of which are still retained by the trustee.
28 I{ALSBuRY, LAWS oF ENGLAND (1914) § 402.
9. For a discussion of the extent to which deviation is permissable, see Scott, Deviation
from the Terms of a Trust (ig3I) 44 HARv. L. REv. i025.
10. See z PARxER, CHANCERY (i8o7) 20; 4 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGrzSH
LAW (I924) 417 et seq.
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proving, as was likely, when opposed to self-interest, an extremely pre-
carious security, John Waltham, Bishop of Salisbury, who was Lord
Keeper in the reign of Richard the Second, originated the writ of
subpcena, by which the trustee was liable to be summoned into Chan-
cery, and compellable to answer upon oath the allegations of his cesui
que trust. No sooner was this protection extended, than half the lands
in the kingdom became vested in feoffees to uses, as trusts were then
called. Thus, in the words of an old counsellor, the parents of the trust
were Fraud and Fear, and a Court of Conscience was the Nurse." 11
There were thus created between the trustee and the beneficiary personal
relationships with which the Chancery courts were called upon to deal. As
will be demonstrated later, the rights of the settlor to compel enforcement
were given little or no regard. It could naturally be expected that the Chan-
cery courts, separated as they were from the law courts, would incline to be
less rigid in their treatment of the interests involved and that the pleas of
trustees based upon appeals to the conscience would under certain circum-
stances not fall upon deaf ears. 12 The correctness of this conclusion and the
nature of those circumstances are adequately demonstrated by the earlier
cases upon the subject.
It was Lord Cowper who laid the groundwork upon which the rule of
the exceptions was later to be based by allowing as a major consideration the
balancing of personal equities rather than the creation of any hard and fast
rule of law designed to preserve and protect the trust device. In Fellows v.
Mitchell & Owen ' two trustees of a mortgage had joined in an assignment
of the same, and each had receipted for the whole although they had received
only a moiety. Upon one trustee's becoming insolvent, the beneficiary at-
tempted to charge the remaining trustee for the whole amount. In denying
liability for more than the amount actually received the Court stated:
"It is attended with circumstances, somewhat uncommon; for the
cestui que trust has admitted, that he was present and consenting to the
payment of the money in moieties, and that at his importunity the trus-
tees joined in an acquittance for the whole. . . The equity in this
case is so obvious that it will weigh with me (if there are no direct
precedents to the contrary) against any arbitrary rule laid down in any
age." 14
That a balancing of personal equities was the moving consideration in
arriving at a judicial determination was again admirably demonstrated in
Smith and Helen his Wife v. French."3  A mother on the wedding day of
her daughter, Helen, made herself trustee of iooo pounds invested in certain
ii. LENv x, op. cit. supra note 4, at I.
12. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note io, at 418, 432.
13. I P. Wins. 81 (Ch. 1705).
14. Id. at 8I, 83.
15. 2 Atk. 243 (Ch. 1741).
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certificates for the sole and separate use of her daughter, with certain remain-
ders over. The husband of the daughter, being sorely pressed by creditors,
prevailed upon the mother to loan him the certificates to be exchanged for
other securities at a profit but instead of so doing, he misappropriated them
for his own use. Upon the threats and requests of the mother 350 pounds
were returned, but the husband died insolvent, and the balance was lost. The
daughter then married one Smith, and together they brought proceedings to
surcharge the mother for breach of trust. The mother answered that at the
importunities of her daughter and deceased son-in-law she had loaned the
latter the certificates and that he had used them improperly; that she had
threatened to sue but had yielded only on the importunities of her daughter
made on bended knee, who time and time again, both before and after the
death of her husband, had agreed to release any demands that might be made
against her mother. During the course of the argument the Chancellor was
reported as follows:
"The principal question here is, Whether upon all the circumstances
of this case, the defendant has been guilty of a breach of a trust, and
this must depend upon the defense which she has set up by way of
rebutter to the plaintiff's demand; if it stood clear of such circumstances
there could not be a plainer breach of trust than delivering these tallies
to the husband.
"But the present case appears to me to be a very hard and a very
harsh demand in a court of equity, as it is circumstanced, taking the
evidence on both sides to be true..
"In the first place: here is a very strong equity for the mother,
that what she did in this affair was at the importunity and repeated
solicitations of the daughter, and who since the death of her first hus-
band has over and over again offered to execute a release, when she
might beyond all contradiction have done it; for though the assignment
was an unfortunate transaction for the daughter, yet as it was done at
her own request, she could not blame her mother for it. ...
"And as it is an extreme harsh one after all the kindness and ten-
derness the plaintiff Helen has received at her mother's hands I am of
opinion that the defense is very sufficient to rebut all the plaintiff's
equity." 16
Although the Lord Chancellor characterized the beneficiary's conduct as a
mere request, the case reveals that there was also an inducement based on a
family relationship. It involved a request which could not morally have
been denied, and the equities of the situation led Lord Hardwicke to treat
the petition for surcharge as a harsh demand. Furthermore, the language of
the opinion seems to raise a doubt as to whether under all the circumstances
of the case the defendant had actually been guilty of a breach of trust. Of
course, if circumstances absolve the trustee from a breach of trust, there is
16. Id. at 244-246.
UNIVEISITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
no occasion for applying any doctrine of estoppel. This intimation of Lord
Hardwicke has never been confirmed. In the application of the exceptions
the trustee's acts have been a priori assumed to be a violation of his trust.
It is the remedy which is denied.
The principle so doubtfully recognized by Lord Hardwicke in Smith
and Helen soon became the accepted doctrine, but it was not long limited to
situations where the trustee's breach was premised upon "inducement", for
three years later in Trafford v. Boehm " we find Lord Hardwicke using as
the rationale of his decision, the term, "approbation", which covers a situa-
tion factually far removed in scope and effect from the limits of the previous
decision. In that case, a trust with husband and wife as beneficiaries was
created, the monies of which were to be invested in lands for the benefit of
the marriage settlement. Pending the acquisition of suitable lands, the trus-
tee was directed to invest in government funds or other good security as the
husband cestui que trust might direct. The trustee, at the husband's direc-
tion, invested in South Sea stock, and several thousand pounds were lost.
Upon the death of the husband, the wife brought a bill to obtain the benefits
intended under her marriage settlement. The trustee filed a cross bill, pray-
ing among other things to be discharged from all liability in connection with
the investment in the South Sea stock. Lord Hardwicke held that the
investment, not being a good security as required under the trust, was clearly
in breach of trust, and that the loss should be made good out of the share of
plaintiff's husband, the fellow beneficiary under the trust. It was stated:
"The rule of the court in all cases is, that if a trustee errs in the
management of the trust, and is guilty of a breach, yet if he goes out of
the trust with the approbation of the cestui que trust, it must be made
good first out of the estate of the person who consented to it." 18
In using the term "approbation", the court may have intended a larger
significance than might have been conveyed by the terms "direction" or
"consent", for stress is laid upon the fact that thereafter the cestui que trust
had approved the various accounts showing this loss and had constantly
received dividends. Any doubts as to the scope of the decision may be con-
sidered as effectively removed by the broad and unqualified language of Lord
Eldon in Brice v. Stokes, 9 where one trustee with the knowledge of the
cestui que trust permitted his co-trustee to use trust monies for the latter's
personal benefit. Lord Eldon said:
"It is clear, upon the settled cases, that if there are two trustees, and
a transaction takes place, in which the fund is taken out of the state, in
which it ought to have remained, and is not placed in the state in which
17. 3 Atk. 44o (Ch. 1746).
18. Id. at 444.
ig. ii Ves. 319 (Ch. i8o5).
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it ought to be, but is kept in hands, that ought not to retain it, if any
particular Cestui Que Trust has acted in authorizing that as much as the
trustee, who has not the money in his hands and continues to permit it
to be so treated, in a question between the Cestui Que Trust and that
trustee the latter cannot be called upon by the former." 20
From these advances in Trafford v. Boehrn and Brice v. Stokes, it was
but a short step to extend the principle to cases in which the acquiescence or
affirmance was subsequent to the original act or was in the nature of a
release. In Walker v. Symonds,2' the trustees failed to invest in mortgages
or government securities as required under the trust and loaned the funds to
one of the heirs and co-trustees without security. A release was later ob-
tained from the cestui que trust, a young woman, who though of age was
unversed in the management of financial affairs. The funds having been
lost, the cestui que trust brought action. Lord Eldon, in surcharging the
trustee and denying the validity of the release as a defense, said:
"It is established by all the cases, that if the cestui que trust joins
with the trustees in that which is a breach of trust, knowing the circum-
stances, such a cestui que trust can never complain of such a breach of
trust. I go further, and agree that either concurrence in the act, or
acquiescence without original concurrence, will release the trustees: but
that is only a general rule, and the Court must inquire into the circum-
stances which induced concurrence or acquiescence; recollecting in the
conduct of that inquiry, how important it is on the one hand, to secure
the property of the cestui que trust; and on the other, not to deter men
from undertaking trusts, from the performance of which they seldom
obtain either satisfaction or gratitude." -2
The problem before the court does not seem to have been fully argued in prior
decisions, and the result is to be explained only by the nature of the factual
situation involved. The fundamental policies of equity in dealing with fidu-
ciary relationships are manifested in the restrictions placed on the power of
beneficiaries to exonerate their trustees. There must be full disclosure on
the part of the trustee and competency on the part of the beneficiary.23
Thus the absence of the latter requisite in the case under discussion operated
to surcharge the trustee, notwithstanding the beneficiary's acquiescence.
The finality of Lord Eldon's language admits of no exception-the
cestui "can never complain." This was unjustified, in view of Ryder v. Bick-
20. Id. at 325-326.
2 . 3 Swans. i, 64 (Ch. 1818).
22. Id. at 64.
23. The incompetency which was before Lord Eldon was neither one of age nor of lim-
itation imposed under the trust instrument, but rather one arising from the inability of the
cestui que trust to comprehend and understand not only the nature of the wrongful act but
also the effect of the release. The principles applicable together with an extensive citation
of authority are given in RESTA=EMENT, TRUSTS (Tent Draft, 1932) § 2o8. Identical prin-
ciples are applied to discharge of liabilities by release and by subsequent affirmance. Id.
§§2o9, 210.
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erton.24 In that early case it was established by Lord Hardwicke that the
beneficiary's acquiescence or consent might, by virtue of the terms or pur-
poses of the trust instrument, be ineffective to discharge the trustee of liabil-
ity. A trustee of a wife's separate use trust had, with the wife's consent,
placed 8oo pounds with the trustee's uncle, without taking the security re-
quired by the terms of the trust. The Chancellor stated:
"The power of the wife must arise out of the articles for after the
marriage she had no power to prejudice herself. The power is that she
and her husband must consent to the placing out of the money on secu-
rity. Therefore, she could not consent to the placing out of the money
on no security at all."
There were thus presented conflicting desires: on the one hand to weigh
the personal equities existing between the parties, and on the other to pre-
serve the terms and purpose of the trust as dictated by the settlor. While
the decision seems to rest upon the narrow ground that the investment itself
was a violation of the testator's will in that regard, it is quite apparent that
the purpose of the trust was to afford protection to one whom the testator
deemed incapable of managing her own affairs, a married woman, and that
this consideration was regarded as paramount.
In England, the problem of how far married women under separate use
trusts were capable of releasing or acquiescing was one on which the courts
could arrive at no complete accord. 25 The final solution is still a matter of
discretion to be based upon the personal equities involved.
Before the passage of the English Trustee's Act of 1888,26 a trustee
was afforded little protection under the exceptions when property was settled
upon a married woman in a simple trust or settled to her separate use with
restraint upon anticipation or alienation. By the terms of that Act however
it was provided:
"Where a trustee commits a breach of trust at the instigation or
request or with the consent in writing of a beneficiary the High Court
may if it thinks fit and notwithstanding that the beneficiary may be a
married woman entitled for her separate use and restrained from antici-
pation make such order as to the court seems just for impounding all or
any part of the interest of the beneficiary in the trust estate by way of
indemnity to the trustee or person claiming through him."
The Act did not operate to curtail or affect the previously existing rights and
remedies of trustees. It altered the law in no respect other than to enlarge
the power of Chancery to indemnify trustees, especially where married
24. 3 Swans. go (Ch. 1743).
25. See GoDEFRoi, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1927) 687, 688.
26. 51 & 52 VicT. C. 59, § 6 (1888). This section was reenacted in 52 & 53 VICr. c. 32, § 45
(1893) and in 15 Go. V, c. i9, § 62 (1925).
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women without power of anticipation were involved.2 7  While not permit-
ting the trustee to avail himself of instigation and consent as an absolute
defense against primary liability, the Act is significant in that through its
passage the doctrine of the exceptions at last received concrete, statutory
recognition.
The conditioning social and economic factors underlying the growth up
to this point of the doctrine of consent, concurrence and release are implicit
in the cases already discussed. In the early cases developing the doctrine
there was a relationship of blood or affection between the parties involved. 28
While it may be argued that little significance attaches to this fact in and of
itself, it must be remembered that under the system of equity as administered
by the Chancery court ethical and moral considerations would be given great
weight in balancing the personal equities between the cestui que trust and the
trustees. It could psychologically be expected that trustees would more easily
be influenced by importunities or requests made by those enjoying relation-
ships of blood or affection. To deny relief under such circumstances would
have permitted cestuis que trustent to traffic in normal human emotions. It
was the reaction to this circumstance which was so strongly revealed in Lord
Hardwicke's opinion in Smith and Helen. Had the rule been confined to
this early basis, little fault could be found with it.
As a correlative factor, there was a complete absence of corporate
trustees. The trust was accepted not as a matter of profit, but as a gratuitous
burden. Nothing was better established in England at the time the excep-
tions were first developed than that a trustee could have no allowance for his
time and trouble. Even today in England compensation is permitted only
where it is directed by the testator's will or, in exceptional circumstances, by
the court.29 Accordingly, aside from the sentimental considerations favoring
one who accepts an unremunerative task for the sake of benefiting others, it
becomes important, in Lord Eldon's language, "not to deter men from under-
taking trusts for the performance of which they seldom obtain either satis-
faction or gratitude." 30
The natural tendency to minimize and excuse breaches of trust where a
gratuitous trustee has acted honestly later received further expression in
27. Even under the Act, when consent in writing had been obtained, it was still necessary
to show that the beneficiary had acted with full knowledge of the facts which made the act
complained of a breach of trust. in re Somerset [1894] I Ch. 23r. See also GoDErRor, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 684; LEwiN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96o.
28. Cf. Smith and Helen his Wife v. French, 2 Atk. 243 (Ch. 1741), cited note i5, supra
(mother and daughter) ; Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swans. i, 59 (Ch. 1818) (relatives and close
,family friends), cited note 21, supra; Booth v. Booth, i Beav. 1241 (Ch. 1838) (trustee a
brother and partner of testator, and trustee's wife a beneficiary) ; Broadhurst v. Bolguay, i Y.
& C. C. 16 (Ch. 1841) (brothers-in-law); Farrant v. Blanchford, i De G. J. & S. io7 (Ch.
1863) (trustee father of one of beneficaries).
29. 2 SPrNcE, EQurrABLE JURISDIcTON OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (849) 937; 2
PERY, TRusts AND TRusTS (7th ed. 1929) § go4.
30. Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swans. x, 64, cited notes 21, 22, supra.
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England in the Debtors Act of 1878, in which the courts were given discre-
tion as to whether or not execution should issue against a trustee found
guilty of negligence but not of dishonesty.31 And under the Judicial Trus-
tees Act of 1893 32 and the Trustee Act of I925, 33 trustees who had aeted
honestly and reasonably might be excused wholly or in part from personal
liability for breach of trust.
The imposition of different degrees of liability according as the under-
taking is gratuitous or for gain is common in other fields of law. For one
illustration, a gratuitous bailee has always been held to a lesser duty of care
towards his bailor than a bailee who is working for hire.34 While statements
have been made that no such refinement exists in the law of trusts,35 there is
no doubt that the trustee's lack of compensation was a strong motivating
factor in developing the rule of exceptions. If trustees had been paid, the
judges would have been less fearful of discouraging men from assuming
trust responsibilities. The absence of remuneration meant also that there
existed no class of professional trustees. The trustee was almost invariably
a novice in that relationship, unacquainted with its legal intricacies and not
infrequently inexperienced with the problems of its management. The his-
toric background is well portrayed by an early text-writer, who has given a
vivid picture of the difficulties besetting those who from a spirit of friendli-
ness or loyalty were induced to accept the position of trustees, only to find
that their inexperience has exposed them to a petition to surcharge.3 6
31. 41 & 42 VIr. c. 54 (1878), amending the Act of 1869. In Earl of Aylesford v. Earl
Poulett [1892] 2 Ch. 6o, the defaulting trustee had not been guilty of dishonesty, and the
monies appeared to have been applied on behalf of the cestui que trust under a mistaken view
in payment of debts of a class which were not within the terms of the trust. The court exer-
cised its discretion and refused to permit any attachment to issue. See also In re Smith [1893]
2 Ch. i, where the court exercised a similar discretion and refused to permit execution against
the trustee guilty merely of negligence in trusting too much a dishonest trustee.
32. 56 & 57 VIcr. c. 53 (1893).
33. 15 Geo. V, c. 19, § 61 (1925) : "If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether ap-
pointed by the court or otherwise, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust,
whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the commence-
ment of this Act, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for
the breach of trust and for omitting the directions of the court in the matter in which he com-
mitted such breach, then the court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal lia-
bility for the same.'
Mr. Augustine Birrell (op. cit. supra note i), after calling attention to the earlier strict-
ness of courts of equity in applying to trustees a high standard of care and skill, points out the
effect of the change in procedure permitting oral testimony. He says (at 16) :
"Now it is all different. The real Trustee, for example, goes into the box-some farmer,
it may be, who from a sense of cronyship has consented to act as a Trustee under the will of
a neighbor with "whom on market days he has often had a friendly glass. There he stands,
ignorant for certain, pigheaded very likely, quarrelsome possibly, but honest, palpably honest
and perspiring. He is charged with losses occasioned by his disregard of the strict language
of a will he never understood, or for not having properly controlled the actions of his co-
trustee, the principal attorney of his market town.
"It may be necessary to ruin such a man, to sell his horses and his cows, his gig and his
carts, and to drive him from his old home, but it cannot be done without a qualm. Hence has
come about that new spirit and temper to which I have ventured to refer at too great length.'
34. See 3 CooLy, ToRTs § 457 (4th ed. 1932).
35. Wood, The Myth of the Gratuitous Trustee (I898) Io JTJRID. REv. 152.
36. HAmPsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 5-II. See Bnut4 op. cit. supra note x, at 16.
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Today, however, when the bulk of trust estates are administered by
corporate trustees, in business for profit and representing themselves as
specially qualified, it is doubtful if the protection afforded the trustees under
the plea of good faith and exceptions to liability is any longer socially desir-
able. The distinction has been felt by the English Court of Appeals, which
has intimated that a corporate trustee, paid for its services and in business
for the very purpose of administering trust estates, might not be entitled to
the remedial provisions of the Trustees Act referred to above. 7  On the
whole, in view of the development of the corporate trustee, the almost com-
plete disappearance of the wife's separate use trust, and the disintegration
of family ties as a means for perpetuating lineage and wealth, it is an open
question whether the sentiments of the early English chancellors are entitled
to an abiding force.3
II
Relatively nothing has been added to the doctrine of the exceptions by
the American cases. It was transplanted and accepted almost in toto by the
American courts. Indeed, the same social conditions which were conducive
to liberalism in dealing with the liability of a trustee were present in Amer-
ica, and the courts did not find it necessary to re-examine the historical or
logical premises of the rule. As to the rule itself, nothing has been added
by the later decided English or American cases, except the verbiage designed
to express its mechanism. Under a given set of facts involving affirmation,
consent or release, the result is nearly a foregone conclusion.
"Estoppel" is the word frequently called upon by the courts to ration-
alize their position. Yet none of the existing theories of that convenient
37. Cf. National Trustees Co. of Australasia v. General Finance Company of Australasia,
[19o] A. C. 373, 381.
38. In Re Clark's Will, 136 Misc. 88I, 889, 242 N. Y. Supp. 210, 220 (Sur. Ct. 193o) the
court pointed out that the fact that the trustee was a trust company was an important if not
decisive factor in the imposition of liability.
"In trust relations these days, when trust companies have entered the business, much
more is expected from a corporate trustee than from the old fashioned individual executor
or trustee. Trustees seek this character of business, claiming that they are specially
qualified and financially responsible. They make a specialty of trust matters and claim
to be familiar with the authority of executors and trustees as to trust investments. They
have claimed that each estate and trust will receive the personal attention of one trust
executive whose life work is the administration of estates and trusts, and decisions with
regard to the purchase and sale of securities will be independently arrived at by these
officers in consultation with investment experts. The courts, and particularly the Surro-
gate's Court, vigilantly enforce the highest standard of fidelity of trustees and zealously
guard the rights of beneficiaries:'
While the Clark case was overruled by the Court of Appeals in 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E.
397 (ig3I), no reference is made in the upper court's decision to the distinction suggested by
the lower court.
In Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 39, 148 Atl. 912, 914 (i93O), it was argued that "a stricter
rule of responsibility should be exacted from trust companies as fiduciaries than from the
ordinary individual trustee", but the court said that the record in the case did not "warrant con-
sideration of any such advance in the law", and that "rulings which involve enlarged applica-
tion of established principles to new conditions, and, when subsequently followed, give rise to
what become known as new or advanced principles, should be made only in cases where the
facts relied on plainly appear and clearly call for such rulings".
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device are correctly applicable. A case for the orthodox estoppel in pais can
be made only in disregard of one of its fundamental elements. Since the
trustee is not deceived into believing that his act is not in fact a breach of
trust, but is well aware of the risks and liabilities ordinarily involved, it is
clear that he cannot show a misrepresentation of an existing state of facts.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, as described by Professor Williston,39
is likewise unavailable, because of the absence, in the ordinary case, of any
promise by the beneficiary that he will not hold the trustee liable for the
breach. Under either theory, also, if estoppel by inducement is a basis of
the principle, then consent, affirmation or release given by the beneficiary
after the breach of trust has resulted should not prevent surcharge for losses
incurred before the beneficiary has acted. Apparently, however, no case has
ever distinguished those situations where the beneficiary's consent was given
prior to the improper conduct from those where the consent was subsequently
obtained. If "estoppel" applies in the latter instances, it does so with a skill-
ful retroactiveness. Furthermore, no case seems to involve any inquiry or
comment by the court as to whether or not there was any testimony pre-
sented indicating that the trustee would have abandoned his wrongful posi-
tion had the beneficiary so desired. 40 The trustee having first deviated from
the terms of a trust, the courts all seem to have assumed that the subsequently
obtained consent or affirmation of the beneficiary was the decisive factor in
persuading the trustee to continue his improper conduct. The inference is
that if the beneficiary had not given his consent or affirmation to the devia-
tion, the trustee would promptly have ceased his deviation and once more
conducted himself as he should. It is contrary to human experience to
assume that the trustee, having voluntarily entered upon a wrongful course
of conduct, would invariably have abandoned that position if he had not
received the consent, acquiescence or assent of the cestui que trust. From
this point of view, therefore, it is submitted that mere proof of the bene-
ficiary's acquiescence plus the additional safeguards covering the beneficiary's
knowledge of the facts, the law, and his relationship with the trustee, should
not be enough to induce the courts to apply a doctrine of estoppel without
evidence of the trustee's willingness to act in accord with the beneficiary's
disapproval of the trustee's deviation.
In a situation where liability on the part of the trustee is denied because
of a release, formal or otherwise, the courts do not expressly apply the doc-
trine of estoppel, but deal with the more formal concepts of a contractual
39. I WnL IsvoN, CONTRACrS (1920) 307.
4o. A trustee who deviates from the terms of a trust with the beneficiary's consent is liable
for a continuation of the deviation after the beneficiary has retracted his consent. Sherman
v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483 (1873) (improper investment) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft,
1932) § 208.
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relinquishment and abandonment of a right.4 ' The validity of the release,
however, is not tested solely by the ordinary concepts of contract law. It is
required in addition that the cestui que trust be competent and under no dis-
ability, and that there be full disclosure and fairness.
This doctrine of release raises an interesting analogy to that principle
of trust law which permits the beneficiary under certain conditions to void
contracts made with his trustee in reference to the trust property. Where
the trustee has failed to reveal that the trust property is involved, the contract
is voidable by the beneficiary with no further showing. However, where the
beneficiary is advised that the trustee is dealing with the trust property and
consents thereto, the contract is voidable only if in the judgment of the court
there has not been full disclosure and fairness.42  It follows that where the
trustee has committed a breach of trust by dealing with trust property for
his own benefit without the knowledge of the beneficiary, and has subse-
quently obtained a release, the only inquiry of the court is directed toward the
validity of the release. That is, the issue is no longer the character of the
trustee's violation, but rather the nature of the conditions under which the
release was given and obtained.
The question of consideration for such a release is one with which the
courts seem little concerned: Where the release is given before any damage
has resulted to the beneficiary, no great difficulty is presented, as the courts
may then revert to their theory of estoppel. However, where the loss has
been irrevocably established before acquiescence by the beneficiary, a release
by the cestui que trust which is not supported by adequate consideration must
necessarily partake of the quality of a gift. The situation has been considered
to require the sanctity of a formal release. 43 But since it is well established
that in equity a seal has no binding effect, this reasoning would seem to be
inaccurate. In several of the early Chancery cases, while the question of
consideration seems to have been discussed, there is no definite statement as
to its necessity, and the court places emphasis only upon the elements of fair-
ness and full disclosure.
In all these cases the courts paid little or no attention to the trustee's vari-
ous duties, inherent in the trust relationship. Amongst these is that of loyalty;
a duty whose breach is completely condoned under the governing principles
41. See Pope v. Farnsworth, 146 Mass. 339, 344, 16 N. E. 262, 266 (1888) ; cf. French v.
Hobson, 9 Ves. io3 (Ch. 8o3) ; Wilkinson v. Parry, 4 Russ. 272 (Ch. 1828) ; Aylwin v.
Bray, cited in Small v. Attwood, 2 Y. & J. 512, 517 (Ex. 1828) ; Blackwood v. Borrowes, 2
Con. & Law (Ir. Ch. 1843). But see Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215, 234, 247 (1877).
42. REsTATFIANT, TRUSTS, EXPLANATORY NOTEs (593i) § i65. The cases are numerous
to the effect that a sale of trust property by the trustee to himself individually is voidable by
the beneficiary. Broder v. Conklin, 121 Cal. 282, 53 Pac. 699 (1898) ; Bennett v. Weber, 323
Ill. 283, 154 N. E. 5o5 (1926) ; Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. C. C. 400, 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 320 (Ch.
1791) ; Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 678 (Ch. 18oo) ; Wright v. Morgan, [1926] A. C. 788.
43. Pope v. Farnsworth, 146 Mass. 339, 16 N. E. 262 (1888). See LawiN, TRUSTS (13th
ed. 1928) 978, 979. But see Stockhouse v. Barnston, io Ves. 466 (Ch. i8o5) ; Farrant v.
Blanchford, x De G. J. & S. io7 (Ch. 1863) ; Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215, 234,
237 (x876).
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of consent, affirmation or release. It is to the acts of the beneficiary alone,
not to the nature of the breach that the court looks, and the fact that there
has been a most flagrant violation of the duty of loyalty by the trustee will
not prevent the application of the doctrine of estoppel. Of course, in situa-
tions where the acquiescence of the supposed cestui que trust was given
before he assumed the relationship of beneficiary, it could be argued that
the doctrine of loyalty could be safely ignored. Thus, in Chillingworth v.
Chambers,44 the plaintiff and defendant as trustees made unauthorized
investments. Later the plaintiff became by inheritance the beneficiary, and
instituted action against the defendant. It was held that the plaintiff's
acquiescence and concurrence, even though not in his character as beneficiary,
was sufficient to estop him from recovering.
The most that can be said for the doctrine of estoppel is that it affords
the court a convenient terminology for reaching the desired result. Other
legal principles have been pressed into service with little more applicability.
Thus even the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria has been indicated as the
proper ground for precluding relief to the beneficiary. In Fyler v. Fyler,
45
Lord Langdale in referring to a breach of trust, stated:
"It is said . . .yet it was done manifestly for the advantage of
one of the cestui que trusts, and with the consent of some of the others;
and if that were so-if all this has taken place with the consent of the
parties now complaining, it certainly appears to me that they would not
have any right to maintain this suit, for volenti non fit inJuria. If they
have authorized this course of dealing with their own fund, it would be
in the highest degree unjust, to permit them to establish a claim against
those who have acted under their authority." 46
When the beneficiary has actively instigated and assisted the trustee in the
wrongful acts, then it may properly be considered that he has brought upon
himself the loss complained of and has only himself to blame. But in cases
where the wrong originates with the trustee and the beneficiary later assents,
affirms or concurs, the theory of volenti non fit injuria is not applicable, since
at the time of the wrong the beneficiary in no way assented to the risk.
III
In view of the extent to which trustees have been permitted to escape
liability for every conceivable breach of trust, either under exoneration clauses
in the trust instrument itself or by pleading the beneficiary's consent, acqui-
escence or release, the trust device as a means of affording a disposition of
property becomes in many cases an abortive instrument. The class now in
44. [I896] I Ch. 685.
45. 3 Beav. 550 (Ch. 1841).
46. Id. at 559, 56o.
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need of protection is that of the settlors of trusts, among whom the belief
is still fairly common that the right to control and dispose of their property
after death is inherent and natural. It is of course recognized that such is
not the case.47 Dispositions of property depend on and are now universally
governed by statute, so that a testator or settlor seeking assurance as to what
may legally be done with his property is confronted with legal regulations,
universally embodying one, and in most of the United States two, restric-
tions: first, that one may not leave his property for a use which is against
public policy; 48 secondly, the rule against perpetuities4 9  But having created
a trust in the light of these and other legal requirements, the settlor is pre-
sumably entitled to rely upon the fact that in the administration of his estate
his expressed intent will be rigidly enforced and that neither courts, bene-
ficiaries nor legislatures are competent to violate his instrument. In the appli-
cation of the rule that the settlor's expressed intent is the guiding principle
in the administration of a trust estate, deviation from the' terms of a trust
is zealously guarded against, even though such deviation may be claimed as
beneficial and desirable. Only in cases of emergency, public policy, impossi-
bility of performance, or where it is necessary to effectuate the. very purpose
of the trust itself, is deviation permitted or allowed, and then only upon
proper application to the court.50
In a situation, therefore, where the settlor has set up a certain plan of
distribution or attempted to preserve the corpus by authorizing investments
only in certain types of approved securities, a request of the trustee to deviate,
made in the honest belief that it would be beneficial, must necessarily be
denied by the court, even though the prayer be joined in by both the bene-
ficiary and the trustee. Despite this fact, where the trustee deviates with the
consent, acquiescence or release of the cestui que trust, a sanction which the
court itself could not grant is afforded the parties by the magic of these terms.
There is no distinction to be discovered between trusts inter vivos and those
created by will, as far as this inquiry is concerned. Under both situations,
since the settlor or his personal representatives would, by the weight of
authority, be unable to bring any action whatsoever to prevent such viola-
tion,51 there is offered unparalleled opportunity for trustees and beneficiaries,
47. PoLLocK & MAITLAND, HIS'oRY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 18_9) 26o-313, 348-
363; MAINE ANCIENT LAW (ioth ed. 19o6) 227-243.
48. See Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527, 542,
632, 658.
49. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PnE"ErulT-is (3d ed. 1915) § 201,
5o. See Scott, Deziations front the Terms of the Trust (931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 12o5;
RESTATE ENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, I93i) §§ x61, 162, 163.
51. See REsTA=TMENT, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 1932) § 206. The heirs or personal repre-
sentatives of the settlor cannot maintain such a suit. Field v. Andrada, i06 Cal. 107, 39 Pac.
323 (1895) ; Barrette v. Dooly, 21 Utah 81, 59 Pac. 718 (1899). A person who would inci-
dentally benefit from the performance of a trust but who is not a beneficiary of the trust
cannot maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust. Town of Sharon v. Simons,
30 Vt. 458 (1857) ; Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Cl. & Fin. 129 (H. L. 1838) semble. But some cases
have held that the settlor can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust or to en-
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innocently or collusively, to disregard completely the testator's directions as
to payment of income, disposition of property, management of his business
and countless other matters upon which he may have expressed himself.
In many cases the settlor seeking safety for the corps expressly dir~cts
that investments are not to be made in other than those securities now or
hereafter to be designated as legal investments. To apply the doctrine of
estoppel in those situations so as to deny liability for breach of trust is to
negative effectively not only the settlor's intent but the law of the particular
jurisdiction involved. Statutory restrictions and the settlor's directions as
to investment become, in the final analysis, nothing more than mere directions
to be followed only in the absence of private arrangements between the
trustees and beneficiaries. At least one court, however, has construed the
legal investment statute of its particular state as imposing an obligation upon
the trustee which not even acquiescence on the part of the cestui could relieve.
In Aydelott v. Breeding,5 2 the Kentucky statute respecting legal investments
by trustees made it unlawful to invest in bonds of railroads in operation for
less than ten years or which had not paid interest on their obligations during
a like period. The trustee invested in such bonds and when surcharge was
requested for the loss occasioned thereby defended on the ground that the
cestui had acquiesced. In dismissing his argument the court said:
"The contention of appellant that he made the investment in ques-
tion at the instance of appellee is not sufficiently sustained by the evi-
dence, and if it were, it may well be doubted whether a request upon her
part to make the investment would relieve appellant from the responsi-
bility of the loss incident thereto. Certainly her acquiescence in the
investment would not have such an effect." 53
The position taken by the Kentucky court is, however, undoubtedly against
the vast weight of authority, and a violation by a trustee of a statute defining
legal investments is on the same footing as a violation of a duty defined by
the trust instrument, so far as the ability of the beneficiary to "estop" him-
self is concerned.
54
In addition to the fact that the settlor's intention as to the distribution
of his property is deprived of an effective sanction, the interests of the
join or obtain redress for a breach of trust. Carr v. Carr, 185 Iowa 1205, 71 N. W. 785
(igig) (trustee conveyed land to benefidiary; suit maintainable, but conveyance proper);
Abbott v. Gregory, 39 Mich. 68 (1878).
52. III Ky. 847, 64 S. W. 916 (igoi).
53. Id. at 856, 64 S. W. at 918. In Illinois, the statute provides that no trustees shall in-
vest trust funds in any bonds in which "cautious and intelligent persons do not invest their
own money". ILL REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1921) § 144, c. 3. Under such a provision as this,
would not the court necessarily have to require a higher degree of competency before per-
mitting the cestui que trust to be estopped by his approval of the investment? Certainly some
proof that the cestui was a cautious and intelligent person should be required in all cases, and
especially where the testator by limiting the beneficiary's power to deal with the property
has signified that he does not consider the beneficiary sufficiently able to be trusted with its
administration.
54- See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1932) §§ 208-210.
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beneficiary are seriously affected by the doctrine of exceptions. In many
instances, the deliberate purpose of the settlor in creating the trust is to
remove from one whom he deems incapable of managing his own affairs the
power to deal at will with the trust property. The inabilities or inexperience
of such a one may afford the greatest practical justification for the settlor's
lack of confidence, and yet may easily not be such as to destroy the legal
requisite of competence. To permit such a beneficiary to consent or cooperate
effectively in perpetrating a departure from the express terms or ordinarily
legal effects of the trust is prejudicing one who is entitled to have his affairs
regulated by better minds than his own.
The views which some of the early English Chancellors expressed as to
the application of the exceptions to married women's separate use trusts
without power of anticipation were never later confirmed, but, as has been
shown, the application of the exceptions was left largely to the discretion of
the court. In spendthrift trusts, designed to protect the cestui que trust from
his own follies and inexperience, it would be expected that the courts would
refuse to apply the doctrine of estoppel; yet even beneficiaries under spend-
thrift trusts have been estopped by their consent, acquiescence or release. 5
Further, the doctrine of the exceptions permits an unwarranted delega-
tion to beneficiaries of the duty of management. Many trustees, by the
practice of consultation, which is prevalent, are permitted to place benefici-
aries in the compromising position of being required either to approve or
disapprove of the contemplated investment. While mere knowledge of a
contemplated breach of trust has been held not to amount to acquiescence,
yet in estopping the beneficiaries there is no clear line of demarcation
observed, and courts have sometimes placed great weight on the fact that the
beneficiaries were consulted, kept advised and never dissented.5 6 Especially
where trust companies describing themselves as experts are employed for the
very purpose of relieving settlors and beneficiary of the details of manage-
ment are such actions unwarranted. Having been selected because of their
purported reliability and competence, they should not be permitted to divide
responsibility, and no action of the beneficiary regarding management should
relieve them from the burdens of their trust.
55. Sherman v. Parrish, 53 N. Y. 483 (1873) ; Woodbridge v. Bockes, 59 App. Div. 503,
69 N. Y. Supp. 417 (4th Dep't igoi), aff'd 17o N. Y. 596, 63 N. E. 362 (1902). But cf.
Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 At. 380 (1933) (beneficiary under
spendthrift trust may not agree to termination or deviation even though there are no remain-
ders over); Stanbaugh Estate, 135 Pa. 585, i9 Atl. io58 (i89o). The writer has not at-
tempted to exhaust or classify the cases upon spendthrift trusts as the views in each particu-
lar jurisdiction vary not only in their reaction to the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel
in such situations, but also as to the nature and definition of what constitutes spendthrift
trusts.
56. See Armitage Estate, 195 Pa. 583, 46 Atl. 17 (9oo), in which the court held that
as the cestuis bad been consulted with regard to the action of the trustee in making invest-
ments, they were estopped from surcharging for losses occasioned in connection therewith.
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The situation has been admirably summed up in the dissenting opinion
in Estate of Allis.57 In that case, investments had been made in certain
speculative securities for which surcharge was requested. In addition to the
fact that the corporate trustees had acted under an exoneration clause per-
mitting investment in non-legal securities, the court further found that the
beneficiaries by concurring and acquiescing should be estopped. Crownhardt,
J. stated in his dissent:
.. there can be no estoppel.. To do so is to disregard
the terms of the trust and to hold the cestui que trust responsible for the
obligations imposed on the trustee. That disregards the very purpose
of the trust. In creating the trust the testator deemed the widow and
orphan incompetent to manage the estate. He therefore placed his faith
in the trustees he named and in the supervisory power of the courts.
He placed his estate beyond the power of his widow or his daughter to
dissipate through their inexperience or improvidence. By applying the
rule of estoppel, the court circumvents the terms of the trust and the
will of the testator. The will did not permit the beneficiaries to squander
the estate, and the court should not permit the trustees to do so under
cover of consent of the beneficiaries." 58
Whether the testator or settlor could under the present state of the law
effectively protect his beneficiary from his own follies or prevent collusion
between the cestui and the trustee is a question open to serious doubt. Sup-
pose a testator, having been fully advised as to the present extent of the
exceptions to liability, directs the preparation of a trust instrument containing
the following clause:
"Having been fully advised that my trustee may safely depart from
the terms of this trust where requested, or where the consent, release or
affirmation of my beneficiary has been obtained, it is my express wish
and direction that my trustee shall under no circumstances depart from
the terms of this trust without leave of court first had and obtained;
further that my beneficiary shall be without power of consent, affirma-
tion or release in and to any violation by the trustee under the terms of
this trust, should the same occur or be proposed."
With such clear admonition from the testator the doctrine of estoppel would
seem to vanish into thin air. Certainly, the express wish of the testator
should materially affect the possibility of inducement as an element of estop-
pel, upon which the trustee could rely. The inequity of unfairness could not
be pleaded. It is true, however, that the court would then be faced with
a situation wherein the beneficiary, otherwise sui juris, would be rendered
incapable of entering into a contract of release during the life of the trust.
It is submitted that such restraint on the freedom of contract is not too
57. 191 Wis. 23, 37, 2o9 N. W. 945, 95o (1926).
58. Id. at 59, 19I Wis. at 958.
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alarming as an innovation of the law and should not be considered as a
serious deterrent in deciding in favor of the validity of such a clause. In
many respects the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary raises
duties imposing limitations upon the freedom of contract. The matter neces-
sarily resolves itself into balancing the effect of a testator's or settlor's instru-
ment against that of a consensual arrangement between the beneficiary and
the trustee. Since the right of the beneficiary to share in the testator's bounty
is based on the settlor's instrument itself, his freedom of contract in relation-
ship to the trust might well be considered a derivative right rising no higher
than that which the instrument expressly or impliedly confers. By accepting
the benefits of the trust, it could be said that the beneficiary manifests an
election to be found by its terms.
But lying beyond any technical possibilities of rationalizing a change in
the present law is the question of the modern wisdom of a doctrine which
developed and flourished under social and economic conditions long since
departed.
